Proseuctor v. Ntaganda – The International Criminal Court’s Dangerous Foray into the Shades of Lochner by Blank, Shane K.
PROSECUTOR V. NTAGANDA—THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S 
DANGEROUS FORAY INTO THE SHADES OF 
LOCHNER 
Shane K. Blank1 
In a 2017 Judgment by the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the ICC interpretively expanded the scope of “war 
crimes” under its jurisdiction—part of Article 8 of the Rome Statute—to 
include such crimes as committed against one’s own military forces. The 
ICC’s decision to expand the war crimes regime into intra-force 
concerns, which are ordinarily the subject of domestic law, is 
“unprecedented”—an acknowledgment found in the Judgment itself. 
This decision, reached in Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, constitutes one of the 
clearest examples of judicial activism by the ICC since its formation; and 
such activism, should it continue, threatens the ICC’s long-term 
legitimacy amongst the 123 sovereign nations who have voluntarily 
agreed to its jurisdictional authority. 
This article looks critically at the judicial activism that took place in 
the Ntaganda decision. Invoking the infamous case of Lochner v New. 
York (of early twentieth-century U.S. Supreme Court lore), comparisons 
are drawn between Ntaganda and Lochner as a method of highlighting, 
and hopefully warning against, further Lochner-esque type decision-
making by the ICC should it wish to retain its appeal amongst current 
members of the Rome Statute. Ultimately, the article concludes that the 
ICC failed to abide by the strict constructionist mandates found both 
directly and indirectly in Articles 8, 21, and 22 of the Rome Statute. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1905, the U.S. Supreme Court penned the now–”reviled” decision 
of Lochner v. New York.2 The dispute involved was rather unspectacular: 
should a state legislature be allowed to enact laws placing a cap on the 
maximum hours worked per week?3 It was how the Court reached its 
result—invalidating the law as an unconstitutional exercise of state 
police power under the Fourteenth Amendment’s controversial 
“substantive due process” doctrine—that now lives on in infamy.4 One 
recent appellate decision called Lochner the “foremost reproach to the 
activist impulse in federal judges . . . widely disparate for its 
mobilization of personal judicial preference.”5 Indeed, in a dissenting 
opinion by Justice Holmes, the following was said of the majority’s 
opinion in Lochner: 
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the 
country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed with 
that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making 
up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I 
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do 
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled 
by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws  
  
 2. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see also David A. Strauss, 
Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (2003) (suggesting Lochner is in 
contention for being the most “reviled decision of the last hundred years”). 
 3. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52. 
 4. Id. at 58–59. The late Justice Scalia—a long-time critic of the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s perceived habit of engaging in judicial policy-making—has likened the 
Substantive Due Process doctrine to a method of achieving legally incomprehensible 
results that the Court “really likes.” See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 
(2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In fact, this concern about judicial policy-making 
transcends Justice Scalia and has a history spanning decades, as shown in Griswold for 
example, where the Court cautioned: “[w]e do not sit as a super-legislature to determine 
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, 
or social conditions.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); see also Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).  
 5. Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 890 (4th Cir. 
1999). 
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may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as 
injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally with 
this, interfere with the liberty to contract . . . . Some of these laws 
embody convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share. 
Some may not. But a Constitution is not intended to embody a 
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic 
relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire. It is made for 
people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our 
finding certain opinions natural and familiar, or novel, and even 
shocking, ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question 
whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the 
United States.
6 
In the international sphere, the Rome Statute has been likened to a 
sort of constitution of the International Criminal Court (ICC).7 As such, it 
is the purpose of this article to highlight a recent decision by the ICC that 
amounts to the same type of methodological affront as was exhibited in 
Lochner: the decision of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. 
Ntaganda.8 There, the ICC took the self-admitted “unprecedented” step 
to recognize war crimes (as defined by Article 8 of the Rome Statute) as 
occurring between an accused and a victim of the same military force9—
a decision previously rejected by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL), that concluded  
 
  
 6. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 7. See Leila Nadya Sadat & Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC Treaty 
Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 755, 
759 (2014) [hereinafter Sadat & Jolly]. “[L]ike the constitutive treaties of other 
international organizations, the Rome Statute takes the form of an international treaty, but 
many provisions have constitutional status.” Id. 
 8. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/NtagandaEng.pdf. 
 9. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Ntaganda against the “Second Decision on the Defence’s Challenge to the Jurisdiction of 
the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9,” ¶¶ 63, 67 (June 15, 2017) [hereinafter Appellate 
Judgment II].  
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[t]he law of international armed conflict was never intended to 
criminalise acts of violence committed by one member of an armed 
group against another, such conduct remaining first and foremost the 
province of the [domestic] criminal law of the State of the armed group 
concerned and human rights law. . . . [A] different approach would 
constitute an inappropriate reconceptualisation of a fundamental 
principle of international humanitarian law.
10
 
In showing how the ICC’s decision in Ntaganda runs afoul of the very 
sort of judicial activism found in Lochner, this article is divided into two 
parts: Part I provides a background of the Ntaganda case—setting out the 
factual background, and explaining how both the Trial Chamber and 
Appellate Chamber reached their respective results regarding the scope 
of Article 8 of the Rome Statute. Part II then focuses on how the ICC’s 
conduct in Ntaganda was, in fact, activist in nature given particular 
limiting provisions of the Rome Statute (e.g. Articles 8, 21, and 22), with 
remarks on what judicial activism is generally, how it might be identified 
in a given scenario, and why Lochner should serve as a stark warning to 
the ICC. Finally, this Article concludes with concise comments about 
why the ICC ought to avoid the allure of judicial activism in order to 
achieve the laudable, but ultimately result-oriented, goal of “end[ing] 
impunity.”11 
II. PROSECUTOR V. NTAGANDA: BACKGROUND AND FINDINGS 
A. Factual Background and an Overview of the Charges Against 
Bosco Ntaganda 
Mr. Bosco Ntaganda (“Ntaganda”) was allegedly the former Deputy 
Chief of the General Staff of the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération 
du Congo (FPLC), an armed component of the Union des Patriotes  
 
  
 10. Prosecutor v. Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1453 (Mar. 2, 2009) (an 
opinion not dissimilar, thematically-speaking, to that of Justice Holmes in Lochner).  
 11. Sadat & Jolly, supra note 7, at 768. 
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Congolais (UPC).12 For its part, the UPC was a political group situated in 
Ituri (a northeastern province of the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) bordering both Uganda and Sudan) having its headquarters in the  
 
city of Bunia.13 Ituri is home to two ethnic groups: the pastoralist Hema 
and the agriculturist Lendu.14 The UPC was formed in September 2000 
by Thomas Lubanga Dyilo15 (recently sentenced to fourteen years in 
prison by the ICC)16 to further the interests of the Hema; whereas, a 
competing group—the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI)—
represents the interests of the Lendu.17 The UPC and FNI came into 
armed conflict in 1999 (called the “Ituri Conflict”), which lasted until  
 
 
 
  
 12. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco 
Ntaganda, ¶ 15 (June 9, 2014) [hereinafter Confirmation of Charges]. 
 13. Id. ¶ 14; see also “Democratic Republic of the Congo Map.” HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, ITURI: “COVERED IN BLOOD” ETHNICALLY TARGETED VIOLENCE IN 
NORTHEASTERN DR CONGO (Vol. 15, No. 11 (A), July 2003), 
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/ituri0703/DRC0703.pdf [hereinafter HRW ITURI]. 
 14. See generally HRW ITURI, supra note 13. The Ituri region is part of the much 
larger Orientale Province, having a population somewhere near 4.5 million people. Id. at 
18. Other ethnic groups within the area—beyond the Hema and Lendu—include the Alur, 
the Ngiti, the Bira, and the Ndo-Okebo. However, it was mostly the Hema and Lendu 
who began clashing as early as May 1999, each group attempting to displace the other 
under policies of “ethnic cleansing.” Id. In truth, both had a history of tension (spanning 
decades) primarily involving disputes over land ownership. At the close of the Second 
Congo War in 2003, whereby Uganda was forced to withdraw from the Ituri region under 
the demands of the Security Council, a vacuum was created facilitating intense, 
unchecked conflict between the Hema and Lendu. Id. at 5. Without a dominant military 
force to police the area, militias from both the Hema and Lendu moved to take control of 
the city of Bunia and surrounding geographic resources. Id. at 19–21. 
 15. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 14–15. 
 16. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on Sentence pursuant to 
Article 76 of the Statute, ¶ 1 (July 10, 2012). Lubanga was found guilty of the war crimes 
of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen years and using them to 
participate in hostilities—the same group of victims that would also implicate Ntaganda. 
Id.  
 17. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 29-30.  
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2003 when the European Union (EU) began “Operation Artemis.”18 The 
EU-led operation (the firsts of its kind outside of Europe) resulted in 
peacekeeping forces wrestling control of Bunia away from the UPC.19 
Eventually, in December 2003, the UPC fractured into multiple smaller 
factions which, though this did not cause the end of armed conflict 
entirely, resulted in a significantly reduced concentration of armed 
hostilities, although conflict continues today.20 
Ntaganda was primarily implicated for his involvement between 2002 
and 2003.21 Ntaganda was alleged to have used his militant force, the 
FPLC, to conduct “widespread” and “systematic” attacks against civilian 
populations in and around Ituri, primarily directed against Lendu people, 
but also the Bira and Nande ethnic groups.22 More specifically, the 
UPC/FPLC allegedly adopted an organizational policy sometime in mid-
2002 to “attack civilians perceived to be non-Hema.”23 The general 
message handed down by UPC/FPLC leadership was to attack all Lendu 
people, since “the war was between the Lendu and Hema,” regardless of 
any particular person’s individual status as either a combatant or 
civilian.24 Before commencing military operations, the UPC/FPLC issued 
warnings to the Hema population to leave the area; anyone remaining, 
regardless of combatant status, would be considered an enemy and would 
be attacked on sight.25 During attacks on the civilian population, it is  
 
  
 18. See ARTEMIS/DRC, EUR. EXTERNAL ACTION SERV., 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-
drc/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2018); see also, HRW ITURI, supra note 13, at 48.  
 19. U.S. INST. OF PEACE, TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY PEACE OPERATIONS 284 
(William J. Durch ed., 2006).  
 20. See The UPC-Kisembo (UPC-K), TERRORISM RES. & ANALYSIS CONSORTIUM, 
https://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/upc-kisembo-upc-k (last visited 
Nov. 20, 2018); see also Who’s who in Ituri – militia organisations, leaders, IRIN, 
http://www.irinnews.org/report/53981/drc-whos-who-ituri-militia-organisations-leaders 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2018). 
 21. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 31. 
 22. Id. ¶¶ 12, 19, 24. 
 23. Id. ¶ 19.  
 24. Id. ¶ 21. 
 25. Id. 
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further alleged that UPC/FPLC soldiers would rape, pillage, and even 
engage in cannibalism.26
 
As a result of the actions by the UPC/FPLC in 2002 and 2003, and 
because of Ntaganda’s leadership over the UPC/FPLC during this time 
(in fact, he was coined the “Terminator” for his direct involvement in 
military atrocities), Ntaganda was charged with thirteen counts of war 
crimes and five counts of crimes against humanity.27 The thirteen war 
crime counts include: murder and attempted murder; attacking civilians; 
rape; sexual slavery of civilians; pillaging; displacement of civilians; 
attacking protected objects; destroying enemy property; and rape, sexual 
slavery, enlistment, and conscription of child soldiers who were used in 
active hostilities. The five crimes against humanity counts include: 
murder and attempted murder; rape; sexual slavery; persecution; and 
forcible transfer of populations.28
 
Two particular counts are of special interest in this Article: (1) Count 
6—alleging Ntaganda was criminally liable for the rape of UPC/FPLC 
child soldiers as a war crime punishable under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the 
Rome Statute, and (2) Count 9—alleging Ntaganda was criminally liable 
for sexual slavery of UPC/FPLC child soldiers as a war crime punishable 
under Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute.29 These two counts are 
particularly fascinating because, as will be discussed and analyzed at 
length in this article, they constitute the first time the ICC has extended 
the concept of “war crimes” to include such crimes committed against 
members of one’s own military force.30 
B. Bosco Ntaganda’s Challenge of Count 6 and Count 9: The 
ICC’s Decision on Whether “War Crimes” Should be Extended 
to Included Such Crimes Against One’s Own Military Force 
Ntaganda challenged Count 6 and Count 9 on two occasions in the 
Trial Chamber, both times arguing the ICC did not have jurisdiction over  
  
 26. Id. ¶ 28. 
 27. Id. ¶¶ 12, 31, 36, 74, 97. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. ¶¶ 76–82. 
 30. Id. ¶¶ 76, 79–80. 
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these counts.31 Conceptually speaking, Ntaganda’s challenge was two-
fold. First, on a more technical front, Ntaganda asserted that Article 
8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, which specifically references Article 3 
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (colloquially referred to as “Common 
Article 3”), does not include crimes of “rape” (Count 6) and “sexual 
slavery” (Count 9) against child soldiers.32 According to Ntaganda, 
Common Article 3 applies only to persons “taking no active part in 
hostilities,” to include civilians, adversaries who have surrendered, and 
adversaries who are hors de combat.33 Concordantly, in Ntaganda’s view, 
child soldiers would not fit within the definition of Common Article 3. 
Moreover, though only briefly referenced by the Pre-Trial Chamber in its 
Confirmation Decision, Ntaganda insisted the Second Additional 
Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Convention (“Additional Protocol II”) does 
not cover child soldiers belonging to the same armed group as the alleged 
perpetrator.34 This first line of argument would become known as the 
“status requirement” issue.35 
Second, and more broadly, Ntaganda argued Article 22 of the Rome 
Statute—codifying the principle of legality—is necessarily “exhaustive” 
on the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.36 In principle, Ntaganda 
attacked the Court’s ability to expand its own jurisdictional reach on 
first-impression issues.37 This particular challenge, while also invoking 
concerns about whether war crimes can include crimes committed by a 
perpetrator in the same armed group, had a much broader scope in that it 
criticized the Court’s ability to engage in what has been likened to a form  
 
 
  
 31. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision on the Defence’s 
challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9 (Oct. 9, 2015) 
[hereinafter Trial Decision I]; see also Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Second 
decision on the Defence’s Challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 
6 and 9 (Jan. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Trial Decision II]. 
 32. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision I, ¶ 12. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See infra note 49. 
 36. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision I, ¶ 12 
 37. Id. 
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of judicial activism.38 This second line of argument concerned, more 
broadly, the ability of the ICC to engage in activist methodologies in 
light of the express strict constructionist regime of Article 22(2).39
 
Briefly discussing the underlying procedural posture of this case, 
Ntaganda’s first challenge (the “status requirement” line of 
argumentation) was rejected by the Trial Chamber on the grounds that 
Ntaganda was, in fact, not arguing jurisdictional concerns at all. Citing 
two prior Appellate Chamber decisions (The Prosecutor v. Williams 
Samoei Ruto, et al. and The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, et 
al.), the Trial Chamber distinguished jurisdictional challenges, which 
attack “whether a crime or mode of liability existed under customary 
international law,” from substantive challenges, which “relat[e] to the 
contours or elements of crimes”—the latter being addressable at trial 
and, thus, not an issue for pre-trial motion practice (the Trial Chamber’s 
ultimate reason for denying Ntaganda’s “status requirement” argument as 
premature).40 The Appellate Chamber disagreed, finding Ntaganda’s 
challenges were, in fact, “jurisdictional in nature” and, therefore, must be 
decided immediately to prevent open “questions as to the Court’s 
jurisdiction [that would otherwise] be left unresolved until the end of 
trial.”41 Thus, the issues were remanded to the Trial Chamber with  
  
 38. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶¶ 52–
55 (June 15, 2017); See also, e.g., Alex Obote Odora, Prosecution of War Crimes by the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 10 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 43, 44 
(2002) (discussing the “principles of legality” in context of both “judicial activism,” 
promoting a liberal and flexible reading of statutes, and “judicial restraint,” insisting upon 
a conservative and strict reading of statutes). 
 39. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 
22(2) (2002).   
 40. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision I, ¶¶ 24, 25–26. “The Chamber 
need not address at this stage whether such children, or persons generally, can under the 
applicable law be victims of rape and sexual slavery pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(vi) when 
committed by members of the same group. Such questions of substantive law are to be 
addressed when the Chamber makes it assessment of whether the Prosecution has proven 
the crimes charged.” Id. ¶ 28 (emphasis added).  
 41. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06 OA 2, Judgment on the appeal of 
Mr Bosco Ntaganda against the “Decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction 
of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9,” ¶¶ 17–20, 40–41 (Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter 
Appellate Judgment I].  
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instruction to address whether it actually had jurisdiction over Count 6 
and Count 9.42
 
On remand, the Trial Chamber turned to the merits of Ntaganda’s 
challenges and found that Article 22—and more specifically, the 
“principle of legality”—did not bar, per se, the criminalizing of conduct 
that had not “been subject to prior criminalisation pursuant to a treaty or 
customary rule of international law.”43 According to the Trial Chamber, a 
basis for the crimes underlying both Count 6 and Count 9 could be found 
in the Rome Statute under Article 8(2)(b)(xxii) for international armed 
conflict (IAC) situations and Article 8(2)(e)(vi) for non-international 
armed conflict (NIAC) situations.44 Indeed, invoking the introductory 
paragraphs of Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute, which 
require their specific provisions to be interpreted “within the established 
framework of international law” (i.e. the Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) or International Humanitarian Law (IHL)),45 the Trial Chamber 
stated rape and other forms of sexual violence have long been prohibited 
by IHL principles and noted that, in fact, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary recently found Common Article 3 
should apply to abuses committed by perpetrators against their own 
armed group.46 Resolved that the established framework of international 
law supported a finding that the war crimes regime could be extended to 
include such crimes as committed against one’s own military force, the 
Trial Chamber concluded it had jurisdiction over Count 6 and Count 9 
pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, as well as Article 
8(2)(b)(xxii) should the conflict evolve into an IAC situation.47
 
On appeal once again, the Appellate Chamber agreed, in sum, with 
the Trial Chamber. The Appellate Chamber first noted:  
 
  
 42. Id. ¶ 42. 
 43. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision II, ¶ 35 (Jan. 4, 
2017). 
 44. Id. ¶ 36. 
 45. Id. ¶ 45. 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 46, 50. 
 47. Id. ¶ 54. 
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When the provisions on war crimes were negotiated, there was a desire 
to “define the specific content or constituent elements of the violations 
in question” [because] [s]tates were concerned, in particular, with 
providing certainty as to the specific conduct that would give rise to 
criminal liability and in upholding the principle of legality [codified 
under Article 22].
48
  
Nonetheless, in disposing of Ntaganda’s “status requirement” 
argument, the Appellate Chamber began its analysis by prefacing that it 
was “not aware of any debate on whether protection under [Articles 
8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi)] should be limited to victims who are 
‘protected persons’ under the Geneva Conventions or ‘persons taking no 
active part in hostilities’ in terms of Common Article 3.”49 According to 
the Appellate Chamber, it was clear that “the drafters [of these Articles] 
intended [them] to be ‘distinct war crimes,’ as opposed to merely 
illustrations of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or violations  
 
  
 48. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 48 (June 
15, 2017).  
 49. Id. ¶ 50 (emphasis added). The Appellate Chamber noted neither article 
8(2)(b)(xxii) nor 8(2)(e)(vi) expressly provide that victims of rape and/or sexual slavery 
must be “protected persons” under the Geneva Conventions or “persons taking no active 
part in the hostilities” under Common Article 3; this is in contrast to articles 8(2)(a) and 
8(2)(c), both of which contain explicit status requirement limitations in their preamble 
paragraphs—article 8(2)(a) applying only to those persons “protected under the 
provisions of the relevant Geneva Conventions” and article 8(2)(c) applying only to those 
who are “taking no active part in the hostilities, including . . . those placed hors de 
combat by sickness, wounds, [or] detention.” See id. ¶¶ 46–47; see also Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 8 (2002). Thus, on this basis, the 
Trial Chamber concluded that to read into articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) any sort of status 
requirement would erroneously “lead to redundancy as to the crimes contained therein” 
since articles 8(2)(a) and 8(2)(c) would cover “identical forms of rape and sexual 
slavery.” Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 47. The Appellate 
Chamber acknowledged this apparent redundancy, but ultimately disagreed with the Trial 
Chamber’s logic, finding that “while the potential overlap between provisions [of article 
8(2)] may be of relevance to their interpretation, little weight should be attached to this 
argument . . . [since] [s]tates were aware of the potential overlap between the categories 
of crimes listed in the various sub-paragraphs of article 8(2) of the Statute.” Id. ¶¶ 48, 50.  
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of Common Article 3.”50 Thus, the Appellate Chamber was obliged to 
consider the “established framework of international law”—phrasing 
used in the preambles of both Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e)—in order to 
determine whether either Article 8(2)(b) or 8(2)(e) should be 
interpretively extended to sex-related crimes committed against members 
of one’s own military force.51 
In considering the “established framework of international law,”52 the 
Appellate Chamber primarily looked to the four Geneva Conventions, 
ICRC Commentaries, and an analogous case from the SCSL.53 This 
process seemingly adhered (at least in spirit) to a seven-part 
interpretative methodology identified by Professor Leila Sedat, who 
writes:  
Interpreting the ICC Statute partakes as much of art as of science. In 
prior writings, I have suggested a methodology applying seven canons 
in addressing interpretative questions relating to the substantive law of 
the Statute based upon Articles 21 and 22 of the Statute, which are 
briefly summarized as follows: First, a plain reading of the text of the 
ICC Statute is required (Article 21(1)(a)), using ordinary principles of 
treaty interpretation such as good faith and consideration of context; 
second, the reading must be faithful to the object and purpose of the 
ICC Statute and consistent with the legality principle embodied in 
Article 22(2); third, where the meaning of a particular provision 
remains ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result that is manifestly 
absurd or unreasonable, the travaux préparatoires may be consulted; 
fourth, if gaps remain in the interpretation of a particular provision, the 
Court should look to Article 21(1)(b) sources of law, which include 
“applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, 
including the established principles of the international law of armed 
conflict,” and, failing that, Article 21(1)(c) sources that are “general 
principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world . . .;” fifth, all provisions should be construed with 
the objective of protecting the rights of the accused and ensuring that  
  
 50. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 48. 
 51. Id. ¶¶ 52, 53–70. 
 52. Id. ¶ 52.  
 53. See generally id.  
14 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 27.1 
 
the application of the Statute is consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights (Article 21(3)). In addition, I have suggested 
two additional canons that should guide any consideration of open 
questions in the ICC Statute: The interpretation adopted should enhance 
judicial efficiency and the effectiveness of the ICC trial system, without 
compromising the values expressed in Canon 5 above (Canon 6); and 
the interpretation of a particular provision should enhance the 
expressive and normative function of international criminal law by 
rendering it transparent and comprehensible and reduce opportunities 
for fragmentation (Canon 7).
54 
It is clear the Appellate Chamber proceeded through the first three 
steps of Professor Sadat’s methodology with little success: Articles 
8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) do not, apparently, lend themselves to a 
plain reading on the issue of scope (at least not in the ICC’s view), nor 
does the overarching objective of the Rome Statute seem to indicate what 
the scope of these Articles should be. Finally, the travaux préparatoires 
suggest only that “the drafters [of these Articles] intended [them] to be 
‘distinct war crimes,’ as opposed to merely illustrations of grave 
breaches of the Geneva Conventions [subsumed in Article 8(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute] or violations of Common Article 3,” though, 
paradoxically, “States were [also] aware of the potential overlap between 
the categories of crimes listed in the various sub-paragraphs of article 
8(2) of the Statute” to include potential overlap between Articles 8(2)(a), 
8(2)(b), and 8(2)(e).55 Thus, in consulting the four Geneva Conventions, 
ICRC Commentaries, and an analogous case from the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Appellate Chamber was resorting to step four 
of Professor Sadat’s methodology—application of Article 21(b) and 
21(c) the Rome Statute.56
 
 
  
 54. Leila Nadya Sadat, Putting Peacetime First: Crimes Against Humanity and 
the Civilian Population Requirement, 31 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 197, 233 (2017); see also 
Sadat & Jolly, supra note 7, at 764. 
 55. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 48. 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 56–61; see also Sadat, supra note 54, at 233; Sadat & Jolly, supra note 
7, at 763–64. 
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In considering the four Geneva Conventions, the Appellate Chamber 
was quick to note Geneva Convention III (GC-III) and Geneva 
Convention IV (GC-IV) are “narrow in scope”—applying to “prisoners 
of war” and “civilians,” respectively—and thus not applicable to 
circumstances involving sexual misconduct against child soldiers.57 
However, according to the Appellate Chamber, “Geneva Conventions I 
[(GC-I)] and II [(GC-II)], which protect the wounded and sick on land 
and the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea respectively, provide 
protection ‘in all circumstances [. . .] without any adverse distinction 
founded on sex, race, nationality’ and prohibit violence against them.”58 
This was noteworthy to the Appellate Chamber, since, in its view, GC-I 
and GC-II protect persons “belonging to enemy armed forces, but [also] 
wounded, sick, or shipwrecked members of a party’s own armed forces, a 
rule that corresponds to the understanding of the scope of protection 
since the first Geneva Convention was adopted in 1864.”59 While the 
Appeal Chamber openly admitted it was “not aware of any case in which 
the grave breaches regime has been applied to situations in which victims 
belong to the same armed force as the perpetrator,” it was nonetheless 
“unconvinced that this, in and of itself, reflects the fact that Status 
Requirements exist as a general rule of international humanitarian law.”60 
Thus, as far as the four Geneva Conventions are concerned, the 
Appellate Chamber was seemingly satisfied to conclude that there is no 
express “affiliation” status requirement (i.e. the need to belong to a 
particular force in order to be protected) since GC-I and GC-II do away  
  
 57. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 58; see also Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
 58. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 59; see also Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field art. 12, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S 31 [hereinafter First 
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 12, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]. 
 59. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 59 (emphasis added).  
 60. Id. ¶ 60. 
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with them in favor of other status requirements (i.e. being wounded, sick, 
or shipwrecked irrespective of what force you may belong to).61
 
But, it seems the Appellate Chamber sensed that it could not rely 
solely upon GC-I and GC-II—indeed, neither actually apply to the 
Ntaganda case itself given that there were no allegations by the 
prosecutor that the child soldiers at-issue were wounded, sick, or 
shipwrecked at the time of the alleged sexual acts against them. So, the 
Appellate Chamber turned to (and strongly favored) the ICRC’s recent 
observation that Common Article 3 “protects members of armed forces 
against violations committed by the armed force to which they belong.”62   
According to the ICRC in its new commentary to Common Article 3, 
“[t]he wording of common Article 3 indicates that it applies to all 
persons taking no active part in the hostilities, ‘without any adverse 
distinction,’” which would thereby include violations committed by 
one’s own party (in fact, Common Article 3 states “‘without any adverse 
distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or 
wealth, or any other similar criteria’”—thus, conceptually limiting the 
phrase “without any adverse distinction”).63 
Finally, the Appellate Chamber—required to narrowly apply only the 
“established framework of international law” under Article 8(2)(e)64—
felt compelled to confront the Sesay, Kallon, and Gbao decision by the 
SCSL, who held in an analogous situation in 2009 that “the law of armed 
conflict does not protect members of armed groups from acts of violence  
 
 
  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. ¶ 61. 
 63. ICRC, Commentary of 2016 Article 3: Conflicts Not of an International 
Character, paras. 545–47, 565, https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=
59F6CDFA490736C1C1257F7D004BA0EC (emphasis added) [hereinafter ICRC 2016 
Commentary]. The ICRC appears content to read into Common Article 3 a “nationality” 
criteria despite its express absence. Notably, the similarly-defined “without adverse 
distinction” phrase in Article 12 of GC-I and GC-II does include a “nationality” criteria, 
suggesting “nationality” was purposefully omitted from Common Article 3. Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Sadat, supra note 54, at 206 n.43. 
 64. See Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 54 
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directed against them by their on forces.”65 In the SCSL’s view, “[t]he 
law of international armed conflict was never intended to criminalise acts 
of violence committed by one member of an armed group against 
another, such conduct remaining first and foremost the province of the 
criminal law of the State of the armed group concerned and human rights 
law . . . a different approach would constitute an inappropriate 
reconceptualisation of a fundamental principle of international 
humanitarian law.”66 The Appellate Chambers disregarded this 
conclusion by distinguishing the SCSL’s holding:  
[We find] the decision of the SCSL Trial Chamber . . . unpersuasive, 
not least because it is apparently based solely on an analysis of Geneva 
Convention III . . .  and the consideration that “an armed group cannot 
hold its own members as prisoners of war.” As noted above, while this 
is true as far as Geneva Convention III is concerned, it is the result of 
the specific subject-matter of [that] convention and not an expression of 
a general rule.
67 
In sum, the Appellate Chambers, while openly admitting the 
“seemingly unprecedented nature of [its] conclusion” and acknowledging 
a perceived possibility that it was engaging in “judicial activism,” held it 
was “persuaded that international humanitarian law does not contain a 
general rule that categorically excludes members of an armed group from 
protection against crimes committed by members of the same armed 
group.”68 It concluded:  
  
 65. See Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 61; see also 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1451 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 66. Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1453. 
 67. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 61. Of course, in 
criticizing the SCSL for relying solely on GC-III, the ICC never stopped to consider that 
it was basing its own decision almost solely upon a loose reading of GC-I and GC-II, 
with only a tangential reference to Common Article 3 based on speculative (and frankly, 
misquoted) commentary from the ICRC. See Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate 
Judgment II, ¶ 60; see also infra note 95 (noting that, elsewhere in the ICRC 
Commentary, it explicitly acknowledges the narrow scope of Common Article 3 to cover 
only civilians and those who are hors de combat). 
 68. Id. ¶¶ 63, 67. 
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[I]n the absence of any general rule excluding members of armed forces 
from protection against violations by members of the same armed 
force, there is no ground for assuming the existence of such a rule 
specifically for the crimes of rape or sexual slavery. . . . [T]he Appeals 
Chamber finds no reason to introduce Status Requirements to Article 8 
(2) (b) (xxii) and (e) (vi) of the Statute on the basis of the “established 
framework of international law.”69  
The Appellate Chamber never seriously entertained Ntaganda’s 
second argument regarding the principle of legality under Article 22 of 
the Rome Statute. Recall that, at the Trial Chamber level, Ntaganda 
argued Counts 6 and 9 violated the principle of legality in that 
“criminalisation of acts committed against members of one’s own forces 
does not form part of customary law.”70  In essence, Ntaganda attempted 
to argue that the ICC was not free to create its own version of customary 
law pursuant to the limitations of Articles 22(1) and 22(2). However, by 
the time this issue finally reached the Appellate Chamber on the merits, 
the Appellate Chambers was satisfied to conclude that determining 
whether to add elements to a crime (i.e. an affiliation-based “status 
requirement” that the victim be part of the enemy force and not the force 
of the perpetrator) pursuant to customary international law was not, in 
fact, a violation of the principle of legality at all, since such additions, if 
they be made, protect the accused from being convicted (the goal of the 
principle of legality is to protect the accused from unfair criminal 
convictions).71 
  
 69. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. 
 70. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision II, ¶ 35 (Jan. 4, 
2017). 
 71. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 54 (emphasis added).  
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. How the Appellate Chamber Got It Wrong: An Erroneous 
Extension on the Scope of War Crimes 
The Appellate Chamber made two distinct, but related, errors in 
permitting the application of Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi) to 
extend to those circumstances in which the perpetrator and victim are 
from the same armed force. First, it erroneously applied the strict 
constructionist mandates of Article 22 of the Rome Statute. Second, it 
mistakenly concluded that Counts 6 and 9, as applied, are within its 
jurisdiction as understood by the “established framework of international 
law.” Each of these errors are addressed in turn. 
i. The ICC’s Error Under Article 22 of the Rome Statute 
Article 22 of the Rome Statute (a codification of the principle of 
legality)72 provides two important protections for the accused. First, 
Article 22(1) states that “[a] person shall not be criminally responsible . . 
. unless the conduct in question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”73 Second, Article 22(2) states 
“[t]he definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be  
  
 72. The principle of legality (captured by the latin phrase “nullum crimen sine 
lege,” which means roughly “no crime without law”) holds, generally, that an individual 
may not be punished criminally unless the criminal law used against the individual 
existed as the time the individual committed the offending act. In essence, it is the civil 
law equivalent of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Where the lines should be 
drawn between judicial interpretations that violates the principle of legality and those that 
do not is left to debate. Some courts use “reasonable foreseeability” as the guiding 
standard, while others use stricter notions. See, e.g., Leena Grover, A Call to Arms: 
Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 555 (2010) (noting that the 
European Court of Human Rights concluded that “strict construction” principles are 
satisfied where a judicial interpretation of a criminal prohibition is at least “reasonably 
foreseeable” by the defendant—even if such an interpretation is not in conformity with 
the exact wording of the criminal law).  
 73. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 22(1) 
(2002) (emphasis added).  
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extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted, or 
convicted.”74 From these provisions, it is clear the Rome Statute 
purposefully adopts the doctrine of strict construction, having chosen the 
Americanized version of Article 22, which expressly included the words 
“strictly construed,” over a competing Japanese version, which did not.75 
More importantly, however, Article 22 expressly mandates that when 
there is lingering interpretive ambiguity—such as what existed in 
Ntaganda (essentially no clear consensus as between the ICRC and 
SCSL)—interpretations shall favor the accused in all respects, thus 
encapsulating the principle of leniency.76
 
The Appellate Chamber first erred in its apparent burden-shifting. 
Recall, Ntaganda argued, in essence, that a novel, first-impression 
extension of the definition of “war crimes” to include such crimes 
directed at one’s own armed forces necessarily violates the principle of 
legality because criminal liability is being imposed without a clear basis 
in precedent. Said differently, Ntaganda argued the definitional scope of 
“war crimes” under traditional IHL principles had only ever included 
victims who were protected at the time of a wrongdoing, by status, as 
either a civilian or a combatant who was hors de combat.77 The purported 
victims in Ntaganda’s case—child soldiers actively engaged in an 
operational military force—were neither.78 Thus, Ntaganda expressly  
 
  
 74. Id. art. 22(2).  
 75. See Caroline Davidson, How to Read International Criminal Law: Strict 
Construction and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 37, 47 (2017).  
 76. Id. at 91 (Professor Davidson, in explaining the relation between the doctrine 
of strict construction and the principle of lenity, concludes that the principle of lenity 
should be invoked only after “an ambiguity remain[s] after all sources of law in Article 
21 and standard tools of interpretation are exhausted.”); see also Grover, supra note 72, 
at 555–56 (“While strict construction cannot be said to have a fixed place in interpretive 
reasoning, it has been suggested that it is one of the points which a judge must consider 
when interpreting a criminal offence. It requires judges to ‘exercise restraint’ and favour 
the suspect or accused when ‘left in doubt about the legislative purpose.’”) 
 77. See supra note 32.  
 78. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Decision I, ¶ 12 (Oct. 9, 
2015).  
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invoked Article 22(1), explaining Counts 6 and 9 were not, in fact, 
crimes under the Rome Statute when the underlying conduct allegedly 
occurred (another way of saying truly first-impression issues must be 
resolved in his favor).79 However, he also impliedly invoked Article 
22(2), suggesting that, if there be some continued ambiguity in the 
definition (and thus jurisdictional scope) of “war crimes” under Article 8, 
such ambiguity must be interpreted in his favor.80  
To wit—and this point will be further discussed in reference to the 
Appellate Chamber’s second error—Article 8 effectively codifies Article 
22(2) (including its strict constructionist ideals) by requiring under 
8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) that a violation, if it not be otherwise captured under 
the Geneva Conventions pursuant to 8(2)(a), must nonetheless be “within 
the established framework of international law.” This “established 
framework” mandate thereby excludes novel applications in the guise of 
customary law, as well as applications that essentially pick sides amongst 
split authorities (to include, also, applications that would themselves 
create a split in authorities).81 Rather than tackle these issues, the 
Appellate Chamber confusingly opined that deciding whether to add an 
element to a crime under the “established framework”—i.e. whether to 
add a “status” element that the victim be either civilian or hors de 
combat at the time of the alleged wrongdoing—is permissible under 
Article 22 because such an addition, if it is made, works to protect the 
accused by requiring the prosecution to overcome additional hurdles 
(recalling that the principle of legality is designed to protect the accused 
from unfair convictions).  
As best as can be gleaned, the Appellate Chamber was apparently 
attempting to decide whether the prosecutor, not the accused, had a valid 
defense under the principle of legality to block the addition of, not avoid 
the subtraction of, a particular element—an unorthodox notion in itself.82  
  
 79. See supra note 36.  
 80. See supra note 76 (according to the general observations of several scholars, 
Ntaganda’s leniency argument is not without a sound basis).  
 81. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, arts. 
8(2)(b), 8(2)(e) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 82. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 54 (June 
15, 2017). “As to the Prosecutor’s argument that the ‘established framework of 
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Furthermore, the Appellate Chamber wasn’t actually adding elements 
under its holding—it only subtracted them based on a conclusion (over 
Ntaganda’s objection) that a “status” element never explicitly existed as 
a “general rule” and therefore wouldn’t be applied in the instant case.83  
Simply put, the Appellate Chamber utterly confused, and frankly, 
ignored, Article 22 in what appears to be an obsessive focus to offer its 
own views on the desirability of the prosecutor’s proposed scope-
expanding definition of “war crimes.”84 Certainly, it can be concluded, 
the ICC was faced with conflicting authority about the interpretive scope 
of “war crimes,” (the ICRC in one corner, and the SCSL in the other) 
which requires, both under the “established framework” regime of 
Article under 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e) and Article 22’s strict constructionist 
and leniency principles, a tie-breaking decision in Ntaganda’s favor—
particularly as to jurisdiction-expanding decisions having an effect well 
beyond the immediate case (i.e. the broadening of “war crimes” to  
 
  
international law’ should ‘merely assist in the interpretation of the crimes and elements as 
prescribed by the Statute and the Elements,’ without introducing additional elements, the 
Appeals Chamber considers that clearly distinguishing between interpreting the existing 
elements on the one hand and introducing additional elements on the other when 
examining the ‘established framework of international law’ may not always be possible . 
. . . In the view of the Appeals Chamber, this does not violate the principle of legality 
recognised in article 22 of the Statute, which protects accused persons against a broad 
interpretation of the elements of the crimes or their extension by analogy; therefore, it 
does not impede the identification of additional elements that need to be established 
before an accused person can be convicted.” Id. (emphasis added).   
 83. Id. ¶¶ 65–66. “[I]n the absence of any general rule excluding members of 
armed forces from protection against violations by members of the same armed force, 
there is no ground for assuming the existence of such a rule specifically for the crimes of 
rape or sexual slavery. . . . [T]he Appeals Chamber finds no reason to introduce Status 
Requirements to article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) and (e) (vi) of the Statute on the basis of the 
‘established framework of international law.’” Id. (emphasis added).  
 84. Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 54. “The Appeals Chamber agrees with the Trial 
Chamber’s finding that ‘there is never a justification to engage in sexual violence against 
any person; irrespective of whether or not this person may be liable to be targeted and 
killed under international humanitarian law.’ Accordingly, in the absence of any general 
rule excluding members of armed forces from protection against violations by members 
of the same armed force, there is no ground for assuming the existence of such a rule 
specifically for the crimes of rape or sexual slavery.” Id. (emphasis added).  
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include a new category of persons).85 However, the ICC chose to tackle 
none of these concerns under the rubric of Article 22. From its judgment, 
there is no sense whatsoever that the ICC factored in the principles of 
legality and leniency, nor that it restrained its decision-making within the 
boundaries of the Rome Statute’s strict constructionist mandate. 
ii. The ICC’s Error in Applying the “Established Framework 
of International Law” Standard Under Articles 8(2)(b) 
and 8(2)(e) 
This leads to the Appellate Chamber’s second error: the Appellate 
Chamber did not, in fact, identify established customary law to support 
its conclusion. To the contrary, it openly boasts about the “unprecedented 
nature of [its] conclusion,” it anxiously comments on its perceived 
“judicial activism” (while stating in conclusory fashion that, in fact, its 
holding aligns with established international law), and it cautions that 
“any undue expansion of the reach of the law of war crimes can be 
effectively prevented by a rigorous application of the nexus 
requirement”—all concerning indications that, in fact, the Appellate 
Chamber’s holding is not so incontrovertible as to be considered  
 
  
 85. See, e.g., Grover, supra note 72, at 555–56. “Judges are mandated to interpret 
and apply the law, which requires giving content in good faith to the text in light of its 
ordinary or special meaning, context, object, and purpose, as well as subsequent practice, 
subsequent agreements, and applicable law. Thus, both the strict construction imperative 
and ban on analogy are said to ‘not stand in the way of progressive juridical clarification 
of the content of an offence.’ This interpretive exercise is not considered to undermine 
the notion of fair warning or separation of powers concerns so long as the Court’s 
reasoning does not yield a new crime not contemplated by states parties. . . . However, if 
Articles 6, 7, and 8 are lacking in some way, it is for the [Assembly of States Parties of 
the Court] to decide whether to amend the Court’s jurisdiction. While strict 
construction cannot be said to have a fixed place in interpretive reasoning . . . [i]t 
requires judges to ‘exercise restraint’ and favour the suspect or accused when ‘left in 
doubt about the legislative purpose.’. . . Thus, elements of the principle of legality 
remind judges to begin with the text of a criminal prohibition and return to it before 
reaching a conclusion by asking whether the interpretation contemplated respects the 
right of the accused to fair notice and is consistent with the role of judges interpreting 
and applying the law but not making it.” Id. (emphasis added).   
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“established” under Articles 8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e).86 Indeed, if the 
Appellate Chamber’s holding is, in fact, “unprecedented” (to mean 
something beyond merely novel, and more so into the realm of simple 
unforeseeability), then it necessarily fails to satisfy Article 22(1) 
requiring “the conduct in question [to] constitute[], at the time it takes 
place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”87 Similar conclusions 
based on the generalized strict constructionist canons of Article 22(2) 
have been routinely drawn in American courts.88
 
Put simply, the precedential preferences of the Appellate Chamber, 
picking authoritative favorites as it did to bolster its own conclusions 
while ignoring or loosely distinguishing contrary authorities, hardly 
demonstrates an “established” practice by the international community of 
the sort that would put Ntaganda on “fair notice” as is required by 
Articles 22(1) and 22(2).89 Indeed, the Appellate Chamber’s myopic 
reliance on certain, favored authorities is easily critiqued and, thus, 
hardly of an “established” quality. For starters, the Appellate Chamber 
heavily relied on the fact that GC-I and GC-II do not require affiliation-
type statuses, being that both apply to protect persons who are  
  
 86. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶¶ 67–68.  
 87. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 22(1) 
(2002) (emphasis added). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 872 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir. 2017) (refusing 
to find defendants subject to criminal liability for novel interpretations of regulations 
promulgated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); see generally Kelsey v. Pope, 
809 F.3d 849, 865 (6th Cir. 2016) (decision of Indian tribal court to recognize jurisdiction 
over conduct of member of tribe, in touching victim’s breast at off-reservation 
community center, was not a violation of “fair warning” due process guarantees despite 
applicable substantive offense ordinance expressly applying only to conduct on the 
reservation; the tribal court’s decision was foreseeable, and thus permissible, given that 
tribe’s constitution mandated exercise of jurisdiction over accused’s conduct and the 
procedural ordinance, complementing the substantive offenses ordinance, explicitly 
defined criminal jurisdiction by reference to the constitutional definition); United States 
v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266, 271–72 (1997) (noting the “canon of strict construction of 
criminal statutes” ensures fair warning by resolving statutory ambiguity in favor of the 
accused unless the conduct is “clearly covered” by statute, and holding that, at minimum, 
this means the unlawfulness of certain conduct must be “apparent”). 
 89. See generally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
A/CONF.183/9, arts. 22(1), 22(2) (2002). 
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“wounded, sick, or shipwrecked” regardless of whether they belong to an 
enemy or friendly force.90 True enough, but both GC-I and GC-II do, 
nonetheless, include a status requirement ignored by the Appellate 
Chamber—the status of being hors de combat, either on land or at sea—
of which the victims in Ntaganda’s case were neither. Thus, GC-I and 
GC-II, concerned only with those who are hors de combat, can hardly act 
as the basis for a blanket rule disposing of affiliation-type statuses as a 
general matter.  
This leaves the ICRC’s interpretation of Common Article 3, to which 
the Appellate Chamber clings in finding that “Common Article 3 protects 
members of armed forces against violations committed by the armed 
force to which they belong.”91 It is abundantly clear the ICRC is 
interpretively reading into Common Article 3, under its “without any 
adverse distinction” clause, a concept of “nationality” as an example of 
the “other similar criteria” prong (recalling that Common Article 3 
requires humane treatment “without any adverse distinction found in 
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar 
criteria”).92 Of course, if we look again to GC-I and GC-II relied on by 
the Appellate Chamber, we soon discover that “nationality” was arguably 
intentionally omitted from Common Article 3, since that term, while 
absent from Common Article 3, expressly appears later on in Article 12 
of both GC-I and GC-II (both state, “[s]uch persons [who are hors de 
combat] shall be treated humanely and cared for by the Parties to the 
conflict in whose power they may be, without any adverse distinction 
founded on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions, or any 
other similar criteria.”).93 The ICRC’s interpretive expansion is, thus, not 
ironclad. Perhaps it could be argued that the term “birth” in Common 
Article 3 is a metonym for “nationality,” though its association with the 
term “wealth” suggests it means something more along the lines of social 
class, rather than nationality.94 Even so, no matter how far Common  
  
 90. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 59. 
 91. Id. ¶ 61. 
 92. ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 63, paras. 545–47. 
 93. Compare First Geneva Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3, 12, with Second 
Geneva Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3, 12 (emphasis added).  
 94. Id.   
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Article 3 might be stretched, it nonetheless includes a status (before 
arriving to the “without any adverse distinction” clause) that, once again, 
does not apply to the child soldiers in Ntaganda’s case—a point 
expressly recognized by the ICRC in its own Commentaries—thereby 
defeating the ICC’s reliance thereupon: 
[COMMON] ARTICLE 3. In the case of armed conflict not of an 
international character . . . each Party to the conflict shall be bound to 
apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no 
active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who 
have laid down their arms and those placed ‘hors de combat’ by 
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction 
found on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any 
other similar criteria.
95 
Simply put, in holding that there is “no reason to introduce Status 
Requirements to article 8 (2) (b) (xxii) and (e) (vi) of the [Rome] 
Statute” on a perceived basis of the “established framework of 
international law,” the Appellate Chambers entirely ignored the long-
running existence of such status requirements as expressly set forth in 
Common Article 3 (those “taking no active part in the hostilities”), GC-I 
and GC-II (those who are hors de combat), GC-III (those who are 
prisoners of war), GC-IV (those who are civilians), and as found by other 
competent international courts, including the SCSL, which found “the 
law of armed conflict does not protect members of armed groups from  
 
  
 95. See, e.g., ICRC, Conflicts Not of an International Character: Article 3, 
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/375-590006 (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
Common Article 3]. As mentioned, it appears the ICRC commentary, itself, 
acknowledges that Common Article 3 narrowly applies to those who are hors de combat 
(or else civilians), stating: “[t]he protection of persons not or no longer participating in 
hostilities is at the heart of humanitarian law. The persons protected by common 
Article 3 are accordingly described by way of explicit delimitations: ‘persons taking 
no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or 
any other cause.’” ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 63, para. 519 (emphasis added). 
Again, this point was either missed or glossed-over by the Appellate Chamber.  
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acts of violence directed against them by their own  forces.”96 As 
Professor Davidson recently suggested, where “an ambiguity remain[s] 
after all sources of law in Article 21 and standard tools of interpretation 
are exhausted”97 —clearly the case in Ntaganda, given (at minimum) the 
conflicting views between the ICRC the SCSL, a modern history of IHL 
law almost completely silent on the ICC’s desired holding, and a very 
questionable analysis of Common Article 3, GC-I, and GC-II bordering 
on results-oriented policy-making98—Article 22(2) required the 
Appellate Chamber to favor Ntaganda.99 It is, in sum, a far cry to suggest 
the ICC was applying “established” international law under Article 
8(2)(b) and 8(2)(e).100
 
In sum, the long-accepted history of IHL—a good starting place for 
any strict constructionist approach, as is required by Article 22(2)—has 
been that “war crimes” are those committed only against civilians or 
persons who are hors de combat (to also include, more broadly, the 
phrase “persons taking no active part in the hostilities”).101 This history  
  
 96. See Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 66 (emphasis 
added); see also First Geneva Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3, 13; Second Geneva 
Convention, supra note 58, arts. 3, 13; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 57, arts. 3, 
4; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 57, arts. 3, 4; Prosecutor v. Sesay, SCSL-04-
15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1451 (Mar. 2, 2009). 
 97. Davidson, supra note 75, at 91. 
 98. See supra note 67. 
 99. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 22(2) 
(2002); see also Davidson, supra note 75, at 91. “Since an estimation of consensus is part 
of the inquiry [of Article 22], judges are less likely to enact controversial expansions of 
the law. In essence, judges must wait for a norm to develop.” Id.; Grover, supra note 72, 
at 555 (suggesting only the Assembly of States Parties, not the ICC itself, should be 
responsible for jurisdiction-expanding interpretations of the Rome Statute). 
 100. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, arts. 8, 22 
(2002). 
 101. See Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 1451-1453. “The law of 
international armed conflict was never intended to criminalise acts of violence 
committed by one member of an armed group against another, such conduct 
remaining first and foremost the province of the criminal law of the State of the armed 
group concerned and human rights law.” Id. at ¶ 1453 (emphasis added); OFF. GEN. 
COUNS. DEP’T DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 1118 § 18.19.2 
(2016), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Man
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was patently ignored, erroneously so, by the Appellate Chamber in what 
can only be described as a results-oriented approach to “end impunity” 
exuding all the signs of judicial activism. At minimum, the ICC made no 
attempt to analyze whether the child soldiers fit into a classic IHL status 
(perhaps they—or at least a few of them—were not, in fact, “soldiers” at 
all, such that, in reality, they were not participating in hostilities) and 
chose, instead, to simply create a new, status-less regime based on a 
loose assumption that “status” has never been the general rule—it is, and 
always has been.102
 
  
ual%20-%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-
190 (noting that “prosecutions of war crimes as . . . [those] characterized as international 
law violations as opposed to violations of domestic law[] have only been undertaken 
when a State seeks to punish enemy nationals or persons serving the interests of the 
enemy State. [Whereas], [w]hen members of a State’s armed forces . . . violate the law 
of war, that State generally prosecutes those persons for offenses under ordinary 
domestic law or military law.”) (emphasis added); ICRC 2016 Commentary, supra note 
63, para. 519. “The protection of persons not or no longer participating in hostilities is 
at the heart of humanitarian law. The persons protected by common Article 3 are 
accordingly described by way of explicit delimitations: ‘persons taking no active part in 
the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and 
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.’” Id. 
(emphasis added); see also HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: 
THE REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICTS 1-2 (Dartmouth Publication Co., 1st ed. 1990); 
Commander Gregory P. Noone et. al., Prisoners of War in the 21st Century: Issues in 
Modern Warfare, 50 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 68 (2004); Rachel E. VanLandingham, Criminally 
Disproportionate Warfare: Aggression as a Contextual War Crime, 48 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 215, 246 (2016); Gabriella Blum, On A Differential Law of War, 52 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 163, 196 (2011); Sadat, supra note 54, at 233. 
 102. Compare note 101, with Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate 
Judgment II, ¶ 60 (June 15, 2017). “[T]he Appeals Chamber is not aware of any case in 
which the grave breaches regime has been applied to situations in which victims 
belonged to the same armed force as the perpetrators. However, the Appeals Chamber is 
unconvinced that this, in and of itself, reflects the fact that Status Requirements exist as a 
general rule of international humanitarian law.” Id. (emphasis added).  
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B. An Unintended Effect: the Dangers of Judicial Activism in 
International Law 
If, as I suggest, the ICC’s decision in Ntaganda is a manifestation of 
judicial activism, why should this matter? Before beginning that inquiry, 
it might be useful to first define what the term “judicial activism” means. 
In fact, it can have many meanings: it can refer to court interference with 
duly-enacted legislation; it can refer to a court ignoring precedent (an 
invocation of the validity of stare decisis, though even stare decisis has 
its limitations in the face of truly erroneous precedent); it can refer to 
judges who willingly “legislate from the bench” (a difference between 
interpreting the law and outright creating law); it can refer to “results-
oriented judging” (whereby a judge has an ulterior motive for making a 
particular ruling); and it can refer to a wholesale refusal to utilize the 
“tools of the trade,” or interpretive canons, when confronting otherwise 
ambiguous legal text.103 Stated plainly, judicial activism is a colloquial 
reference to any conduct by a judicial body that has the net effect of 
damaging its perceived legitimacy (and by legitimacy, I do not mean 
simply that affected persons strongly disagree with the court’s holding, 
but that there are cogent criticisms over the court’s methodological 
approach irrespective of its substantive impact).104 Onlookers may not 
always like the law handed down, or the court’s interpretation of it, but 
they should feel comfortable with the court’s method of getting to its 
result, necessitating stable, transparent, and readily comprehensible 
interpretive decision-making.  
An immediately observable example of judicial activism, which 
damaged the court’s long-term legitimacy through the utilization of a 
poor methodological approach, is the case of Lochner v. New York, a 
1905 U.S. Supreme Court decision that invalidated maximum work 
hours legislation as an unconstitutional exercise of state police power 
based on little more than the Court’s own perception that such laws were  
 
  
 103. See Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial 
Activism”, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1449, 1463–76 (2004). 
 104. Id.  
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“unwise.”105 This case—almost universally criticized today106—would 
later be called a symbol of “judicial activism taken to excess,” and the 
“foremost reproach to the activist impulse in federal judges . . . widely 
disparaged for its mobilization of personal judicial preference.”107 
Indeed, the term “Lochnerism” has become a metonym for judicial 
activism, and commentators now discuss the “Shades of Lochner” as a 
stark warning against repeated legislative invasion by the courts.108 The 
“Lochnerism” concern in American jurisprudence should, likewise, be a 
concern for the fledgling ICC, which, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, 
serves a constituency free to leave at any time pursuant to Article 127 of 
the Rome Statute (as Burundi recently demonstrated in late 2017, and the 
Philippines in 2018).109 Indeed, prominent scholars, including Professor 
Sadat, have argued the ICC should refrain from making “unjustified  
  
 105. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 68 (1905). “We think the limit of the 
police power has been reached and passed in this case. There is, in our judgment, no 
reasonable foundation for holding this to be necessary or appropriate as a health law to 
safeguard the public health, or the health of the individuals who are following the trade of 
a baker.” Id. at 58; Lochner overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 
(“The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner . . . and like cases—that due process authorizes 
courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has acted 
unwisely—has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original constitutional 
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”).  
 106. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, J., 
dissenting). Justices from both parties in American politics, Democrat and Republican, 
have invoked Lochner in criticizing perceived judicial activism. See Id. (Roberts, J. 
dissenting); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 701 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 107. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 890 
(4th Cir. 1999). 
 108. See David J. Seipp, Symposium: Lochner Centennial Conference, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 671, 671 (2005); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 299 (1992).  
 109. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 
127 (2002). It is noted that both Burundi and the Philippines appears to have left the ICC 
over frustration of pending investigations involving them. Still, the point is made to show 
that states can (and do) withdraw from the Rome Statute. Perceived activism is simply 
another, and perhaps more potent, justification for departing. See, e.g., Grover, supra note 
72, at 583 (noting that perceived illegitimacy of an interpretive outcome by an 
international court can dissuade state participation).  
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interpretive leaps in order to ‘end impunity’” since doing so “risks 
destroying the legitimacy of the endeavor” of international criminal law 
as a whole.110 
However, the debate over judicial activism and judicial restraint has 
raged on for many years without a conclusive result as to the appropriate 
line of demarcation. As early as the late 1700s, Blackstone and Bentham 
engaged in heated discourse about the proper role of the judiciary in 
interpreting English law,111 and today, as one can easily glean from a  
  
 110. See Sadat & Jolly, supra note 7, at 768. 
 111. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 
1 OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS (1765) 58 (University Chicago Press, 2002). Sir William 
Blackstone first remarked that “[w]hen any doubt arose upon the construction of the 
Roman laws, the usage was to state the case to the emperor in writing, and take his 
opinion upon it,” an interpretive methodology labeled as “bad . . . [since] it affords great 
room for partiality and oppression.” Id. Thus, Blackstone would have the court “explore,” 
for itself, the “intentions” of the legislator “at the time when the law was made” by 
consulting “the words, the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, [and] 
the spirit and reason of the law.” Id. at 59. Bentham’s disagreement with this approach is 
evident in the following passage: 
A law is made: it is made to a certain end. The intention is manifest: it is to attain that 
end. It is improvidently penned: the effect is, that there is a case in which complying 
literally with its directions would not contribute to the attainment of that end. It is plain 
therefore that such compliance was not intended to be enforced at the time the Law was 
making. Exact it not, then, I say to the Judge . . . [t]o this case the Law is not to be 
interpreted to extend. For to this case the will of those who made the Law never did 
extend. . . . Change of circumstances may happen: but change of circumstances may be 
gradual: and may have happened in the eyes of some before it has in the eyes of others. 
The expectation of some men concerning the enforcement of the Law will not have 
followed the opinion concerning such a change in others. It is for them only to alter the 
course of expectation who first gave it its direction.  
JEREMY BENTHAM & CHARLES WARREN, COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES: A CRITICISM 
OF WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 122–23 (Charles 
W. Everett ed., 1928).  
Of course, modern legal scholars also disagree with Blackstone. If there was a concern by 
Blackstone over the partiality and oppression of legislative interpretive methodologies, so 
too can that concern be levied against judicial interpretive methodologies. To wit, 
consider the late Justice Scalia’s invocation of the oppressive effect of unrestrained 
judicial interpretation:  
The substance of today’s decree is not of immense personal importance to me. The law 
can recognize as marriage whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it 
wishes. . . . It is of overwhelming importance, however, who it is that rules me. Today’s 
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cursory review of the American “substantive due process” experiment 
(and related textual interpretive exercises), a lingering skepticism 
continues to follow high courts who straddle too closely between the line 
of proper judicial interpretation of legal texts and Lochner-esque 
supplantation of the legislative function.112 So, where should the line be 
drawn? 
  
decree says that my Ruler, and the Ruler of 320 million Americans coast-to-coast, is a 
majority of the nine lawyers on the Supreme Court. The opinion in these cases is the 
furthest extension in fact—and the furthest extension one can even imagine—of the 
Court’s claimed power to create ‘liberties’ that the Constitution and its Amendments 
neglect to mention. This practice of constitutional revision by an unelected committee of 
nine, always accompanied (as it is today) by extravagant praise of liberty, robs the People 
of the most important liberty they asserted in the Declaration of Independence and won in 
the Revolution of 1776: the freedom to govern themselves.  
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626–27 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 112. See supra notes 4, 105, 106; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 
(1965) (in an early, formative case for the “substantive due process” doctrine, in which 
the “right of privacy” was first explicitly recognized, the court pointed haphazardly to the 
First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments in order to hold the “right 
of privacy” existed, despite never expressly being mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, as 
an “emanation” or “penumbra” of the Bill of Rights);  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 
45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (stating “[t]his case is decided upon an economic 
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I 
agreed with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my 
mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my 
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their 
opinions in law.”); New Motor Vehicle Bd. of California v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 
96, 107 (1978) (noting the demise of substantive due process principles in the “area of 
economic regulation”—an inference to Lochner and its progeny—has permitted 
“legislative bodies . . . to experiment with economic problems”); see also Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 137, 162, 164 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J., dissenting) 
(stating “[s]peaking solely as a citizen, I would be delighted to awake one morning and 
learn that Congress had just passed legislation adding sexual orientation to the list of 
grounds of employment discrimination prohibited under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. I am confident that one day—and I hope that day comes soon—I will have that 
pleasure. . . . But the arguments advanced by the majority ignore the evident meaning of 
the language of Title VII, the social realities that distinguish between the kinds of biases 
that the statute sought to exclude from the workplace from those it did not, and the 
distinctive nature of anti-gay prejudice. Accordingly, much as I might wish it were 
otherwise, I must conclude that those arguments fail. . . . Just last Term, a unanimous 
Supreme Court foreclosed judicial efforts to ‘update’ statutes, declaring that, although 
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Professor Sadat suggests that “unjustified interpretative leaps,” while 
risking the destruction of the ICC’s long-term legitimacy, specifically 
“run afoul not only of Article 22(1) [of the Rome Statute] but [also] 
Article 21(3)’s admonition that the ‘application and interpretation of law 
pursuant to this Article must be consistent with internationally 
recognized human rights.”113 Similarly, Professor Caroline Davidson 
argues Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute—requiring application of strict 
constructionist principles to the Rome Statute as a whole—”is an 
admonition to judges to avoid usurping the role of the drafters. In 
essence, judges should avoid contravening the clear intention of states 
parties, unduly encroaching on state sovereignty, and unfairly surprising 
defendants.”114 Professor Glover adds, “the principle of legality [under 
Article 22] ensure[s] that rules are ‘fixed, knowable, and certain’ . . . 
[thus,] [i]t remains for the [Assembly of States Parties] to determine 
whether and when a new crime should be added to the [ICC]’s 
jurisdiction.”115 
Thus, one rightfully questions the conclusion of the ICC in its 
jurisdiction-expanding Ntaganda decision. The ICC primarily relied 
upon ICRC Commentaries, GC-I, and GC-II.116 But, as has already been 
explained above, it requires little effort to show how the ICRC 
Commentaries were misquoted (or at minimum, are legally suspect) and, 
further, how GC-I and GC-II have, in fact, no relevance to Ntaganda 
beyond an incredibly indirect suggestion that affiliation-based status may 
not always be required under IHL principles. Mind, too, that I do not 
suggest unequivocally that my interpretation of the scope of Article 8 of 
the Rome Statute must be correct. To the contrary, I aim only to offer an 
equally valid counter interpretation, a conclusion similar to the SCSL’s 
determination (no less side-stepped by the ICC) that “[t]he law of 
international armed conflict was never intended to criminalise acts of  
  
‘reasonable people can disagree’ whether . . . ‘Congress should reenter the field and alter 
the judgments it made in the past.’”). 
 113. Sadat, supra note 54, at 259. 
 114. Davidson, supra note 75, at 42-43. 
 115. Grover, supra note 72, at 582. 
 116. Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶¶ 60-61 
(June 15, 2017). 
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violence committed by one member of an armed group against 
another.”117 In doing so, I urge the reader to look with a critical eye to 
Article 22(2)’s strict constructionist regime (favoring the accused in toss-
up situations after a fair exhaustion of Article 21), and Article 8(2)(b) 
and 8(2)(e)’s express limitation that the ICC apply only “established” 
international law. Ask yourself how these requirements comport with the 
ICC’s “unprecedented” decision (its own description) which, most 
certainly, surprised both Ntaganda and a great many onlookers (a result 
Article 22 tries to avoid).118 How does one know the line has been 
crossed into the realm of unwarranted judicial activism? Apply, 
foremost, the “overriding principle” of ICC interpretive methodologies: 
“a fidelity to the text [of the Rome Statute],”119 pursuant, no less, to the 
specific mandate of Article 21(1) expressly requiring the ICC to look, 
first, to the Rome Statute itself, which requires a considered analysis of 
the precise limitations imposed by Articles 22(1), 22(2), 8(2)(b) and 
8(2)(e) on acceptable interpretive methodologies.120 This, as is 
abundantly clear from the Appellate Chamber’s judgment, it did not 
do.121 
  
 117. See Id. ¶ 61; Prosecutor v. Sesay, SCSL-04-15-T, Judgment, ¶ 1453 (Mar. 2, 
2009).  
 118. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶ 67; Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, arts. 8, 22 (2002).  
 119. Sadat & Jolly, supra note 7, at 765. 
 120. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, arts. 8, 21, 
22 (2002). 
 121. Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06, Appellate Judgment II, ¶¶ 52–70. I should 
pause, also, to take a moment to observe that Additional Protocol I, Article 77, is likewise 
of no use in saving the Ntaganda decision—though I have seen some academic scholars 
rely upon it for its language broadly favoring the protection of children. Foremost, the 
situation involved in Ntaganda was a NIAC, to which additional protocol would not 
apply. In any event, Article 77 of AP also clearly divides itself between civilian and 
combatant statuses. To wit, Article 77(1) discusses children generally as if it were 
assumed they are (ordinarily) civilians, but Article 77(3) talks of “exceptional” cases in 
which children “participate in hostilities,” who are thus capable of being “prisoners of 
war” (Article 77(3) reads in part: “whether or not they are prisoners of war”). Civilians 
cannot normally be “prisoners of war” in any circumstance (unless, when captured, they 
are acting as privatized contractor-type personnel directly assisting the military under 
GC-III, Art. 4(4) or as crews of civilian aircraft or the merchant marine under GC-III, 
Art. 4(5)). Thus, it seems, Article 77 of AP I is of no utility in sweeping away all status 
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C. The Rebuttal: A Court’s Ability to Tell Us What the Law Is 
It may be worthwhile to touch, briefly, upon an obvious rebuttal to 
this article’s analysis: isn’t it part of a court’s job (here, the ICC’s job) to 
tell us ‘what the law is’ (an implication that the ICC was simply doing 
what it is purposed to do)? Certainly so, telling us ‘what the law is’ has 
been the long-accepted role of the judiciary; indeed, to find this principle 
one need look no further than the famed case of Marbury v. Madison, 
where it was declared: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”122 However, to posit that the 
judiciary has the rightful authority to tell us “what the law is” as a 
counter to Lochner is to misunderstand the relationship Lochner has with 
Marbury (while I cite to two U.S. Supreme Court cases in an article 
ultimately focused upon the ICC, it bears mentioning that both have had 
a profound, transnational effect on the development of “judicial review” 
over the last century).123
 
I would submit Lochner is simply the outer boundary for which 
Marbury legitimately operates. While Marbury is the origin of broad 
judicial review, Lochner acts as its necessary endpoint, ensuring, as a  
  
classifications for children whatsoever, as some academic commentators have urged in a 
narrow viewpoint under Article 77(1)’s “special respect” clause. Why is this important? 
Because retaining the distinction—even as to children—between the status of being a 
civilian (GC-IV) and being a combatant (GC-I, GC-II, GC-III), ultimately, differentiates 
domestic crimes from international ones. When someone is a combatant (including 
children), and thus enjoys the attendant benefits of being a combatant, they must 
generally be harmed by an adversary while hors de combat in order to trigger 
international protections (see: GC-I, GC-II, GC-III)—internal harms within a particular 
military force, outside of hors-de-combat-type abuses, normally remaining the concern of 
domestic law, not international law (at least as concerns the “war crimes” regime). See 
ICRC, PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, AND 
RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 
(Protocol I) art. 77 (1977). 
 122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 123. See, e.g., Miguel Schor, The Strange Cases of Marbury and Lochner in the 
Constitutional Imagination, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1463, 1472–74, 1480, 1485–86 (2009) 
(noting Marbury and Lochner’s effect on Argentina, Australia Mexico, Canada, and 
others who “generally adopted judicial review after the Second World War and had the 
opportunity, therefore, to learn from [the American] experience with Lochner”). 
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cautionary tale, that “judicial review” does not dive headlong into 
outright “legislative policymaking.” Professor Schor writes: “Marbury 
now stands for the proposition that courts have an important role to play 
in effectuating rights . . . [whereas] Lochner now stands for the 
proposition that courts armed with the power of judicial review may 
abuse that power and is considered, therefore, to be the opposite of 
Marbury.”124 This seems a sound conclusion—that Marbury (a tool of 
judicial empowerment) and Lochner (a tool of judicial restraint) act as 
necessary counterweights to create an equilibrium somewhere in the 
middle. So, to counter criticism against Lochner-esque judicial decision-
making by arguing the courts have authority to tell us ‘what the law is’ is 
simply to shout from one end of a spectrum as against the other. It misses 
the point. 
It is my humble conclusion that the ICC’s Ntaganda decision 
constitutes a readily-observable example of the aforementioned judicial 
imbalance between Marbury and Lochner. As previously mentioned, 
Article 22—most notably its incorporation of the principle of 
leniency125—requires the ICC to be mindful of activist impulses and 
decide matters of lingering ambiguity in favor of the accused; it tips the 
scales ever-so-slightly away from Lochner-esque despotism. Particularly 
in the realm of criminal law, the shades of Lochner have considerable 
gravitational pull in determining the appropriate equilibrium point, 
providing stronger influence in toss-up decisions to require an exercise of 
restraint over judicial creativity.126 Where, as in Ntaganda, the ICC was  
  
 124. Id. at 1494. 
 125. See Davidson, supra note 75, at 91. See also Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 22(2) (2002). “The definition of a 
crime shall be strictly construed . . . [i]n case[s] of ambiguity, the definition shall be 
interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted, or convicted.” Id.  
 126. See Grover, supra note 72, at 555–56 (“While strict construction cannot be 
said to have a fixed place in interpretive reasoning, it has been suggested that it is one of 
the points which a judge must consider when interpreting a criminal offence. It requires 
judges to ‘exercise restraint’ and favour the suspect or accused when ‘left in doubt about 
the legislative purpose.’”). Unwarranted activism is, of course, most harmful in the 
criminal law arena—as the defendant stands more to lose than simply money damages. 
This is why Article 22 has a sort of bookend application, requiring the judge—in hard-to-
decide interpretative situations—to err on the side of restraint. 
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faced with conflicting authority (essentially as between the ICRC and the 
SCSL, with a substantial amount of secondary authorities favoring the 
SCSL’s position) it cannot be said that, in choosing to side with the 
ICRC, the ICC recognized the appropriate gravity of Lochner. The ICC 
was not concerned with the equilibrium demanded by Article 22, as it 
made no attempt to analyze Ntaganda’s Article 22 arguments. Rather, it 
was concerned only with whether its decision was perceived to venture 
too deeply into the realm of Lochner as to be patently offensive to order 
and justice. This arguably is why the ICC openly acknowledged its 
“unprecedented conclusion” while immediately brushing off any 
potential criticisms of its perceived “judicial activism”—the ICC could 
seemingly sense its own decisional imbalance.127 It bears repeating: 
Lochner, like the ICC’s Ntaganda decision, was wrong not because it 
attempted to tell us “what the law is,” but because it attempted to tell us 
“what the law is” without a concrete methodological foundation. The 
Ntaganda decision ignored the existence of conflicting authority and 
ignored the strict constructionist guideposts of Article 22 in those 
circumstances of conflicting authority. This was the ICC’s cardinal error, 
and it’s dangerous foray into Lochner-esque “judicial activism.” 
  
 127. See Schor, supra note 123, at 1489. Professor Schor mentions the U.S. 
Supreme Court, concerned that it not be perceived as an illegitimate policymaking body, 
now attempts to constrain its activist impulses internally through the use of “judicial 
modesty” (abstract virtues), rather than external mechanisms such as “political 
accountability” (concrete oversight frameworks). In speaking of “balance,” I suppose I, 
too, would offer disciplined virtue as the most enduring remedy against Lochnerism. In 
my view, the judiciary should not be at constant war with the other branches—it should 
not be so mistrusted with power as to necessitate constant oversight-minded rulemaking. 
Rather, judges should respect their incredible power while simultaneously recognizing 
their duty to effectuate the will of the people (or in the case of the ICC, the sovereign 
states), and thus be guided by the need for transparent, consistent, well-articulated 
decision-making (truly, the mandate of Article 22 in a nutshell). As the late Justice Scalia 
put it, a certain court-imposed formalism is necessary to assure the court isn’t simply 
engaged in an unfettered “art or a game, rather than an [observable] science.” Schor, 
supra note 123, at 1490–91 (citing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 8 (Amy Gutman ed., 1997)). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
As mostly only hinted at by other scholars, I would go so far as to 
conclude Article 22(2), in particular, but also the entire framework of the 
Rome Statute as a whole, totally forecloses the possibility of Lochner-
esque activism by the ICC. Such activism has no place in criminal law, 
given the high cost of legal errors, and certainly has no place in an 
international framework whereby the constituency, unhappy with 
perceived activism, may withdraw at any time under the provisions of 
Article 127 to protect against attacks to their sovereignty.128 Professor 
(and former judge) Lietzau notes, “several hundred years of experience 
recommend against imbuing judges with legislative power.”129 This 
sound historical observation, shared by many regardless of political 
affiliation, strikes against the notion that judicial activism is a  
  
 128. See Robert Cryer, The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command 
Responsibility: A Quiet Earthquake, in SHANE DARCY & JOSEPH POWDERLY, JUDICIAL 
CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 163 (Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 2010). “[T]he judges of the ICTY know very well that their ability to affect the law 
is related to the extent to which they can convince states that their interpretation of the 
law is acceptable.” Id. Grover, supra note 72, at 583. “The legitimacy of the Court will be 
influenced by whether judges interpret the Rome Statute in a manner which adheres to 
the rule of law. In order for the interpretive outcomes reached by judges to be perceived 
as legitimate, they should appear to be consistently guided by sound methodological 
reasoning. If judges invoke diametrically opposing canons of interpretation for crimes in 
the Rome Statute, they may call into question the legitimacy of international criminal 
law, as they may appear to be invoking a particular interpretive canon because it yields a 
desired outcome. . . . [I]nterpretive outcomes can . . . encourage or dissuade non-state 
parties to join the Court.” Id.; William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of 
Proof: Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
477, 482 (1999). “[M]any delegations sought open-ended elements in order to expand the 
discretion of the Court. These states envisioned a Court that would not only adjudicate 
criminal cases, but also could define the law and thus foster its evolution. However, 
judicial activism of this nature conflicts with the most fundamental principles of criminal 
law, and it is arguably inconsistent with the Burkean conservative character of most 
English-speaking judges. While the Court should ensure greater accountability for 
perpetrators of the most serious violations of international law, it should not accomplish 
this goal by leaving the elements problem to judicial discretion; several hundred years of 
experience recommend against imbuing judges with legislative power.” Id.  
 129. Lietzau, supra note 128, at 482. 
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worthwhile counter-majoritarian tool used to right long-existing wrongs 
cemented by majorities.130 For every Obergefell, a praise upon the court’s 
ability to break through societal barriers under the power of law, there is 
a Korematsu, a bruise upon the court’s long-term legitimacy for having 
allowed law to unduly oppress the constituency it serves.131 From a 
purely legalistic perspective, both suffer equally from the ghosts of 
Lochner.132 The overarching concern of Lochner-esque activism,  
  
 130. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1962). 
 131. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (invoking court-
created “fundamental rights” under the Fourteenth Amendment to help legalize same-sex 
marriage nationwide) with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding 
as constitutional, under the war power, an executive order forcing Japanese Americans 
into internment camps during World War II regardless of their citizenship). Both have 
been heavily criticized for their perceived nonsensical judicial activism. See, e.g., Dean 
Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative 
Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 77 (1996) (quoting Jacobus tenBroek, Wartime Power 
of the Military Over Citizen Civilians within the Country, 41 CAL. L. REV. 167, 181 
(1953)) (noting Korematsu has been called “a muddled hodge-podge of conflicting and 
barely articulate doctrine”); Strauss, supra note 2, at 373 (suggesting Lochner and 
Korematsu are in contention for being the most “reviled decision of the last hundred 
years”); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court is not a 
legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea should be of no concern to us. 
Under the Constitution, judges have power to say what the law is, not what it should be. 
The people who ratified the Constitution authorized courts to exercise ‘neither force nor 
will but merely judgment.’”); Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2640 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“Our Constitution—like the Declaration of Independence before it—was predicated on a 
simple truth: One’s liberty, not to mention one’s dignity, was something to be shielded 
from—not provided by—the State. Today’s decision casts that truth aside. In its haste to 
reach a desired result, the majority misapplies a clause focused on “due process” to afford 
substantive rights, disregards the most plausible understanding of the “liberty” protected 
by that clause, and distorts the principles on which this Nation was founded.”); 
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 1640–41 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“For today’s majority, it does 
not matter that the right to same-sex marriage lacks deep roots or even that it is contrary 
to long-established tradition. The Justices in the majority claim the authority to confer 
constitutional protection upon that right simply because they believe that it is 
fundamental.”). 
 132. See Steven G. Calabresi, A Critical Introduction to the Originalism Debate, 
31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 875, 884 (2008). “We must never forget that Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, Lochner v. New York, and Korematsu v. United States were all substantive due 
process decisions where the Court was guided by its own twisted ideas about what human 
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encapsulated in the observable legacy it left behind, is that “unjustified 
interpretive leaps” destroy the long-term “legitimacy of the court.”133 The 
ICC’s decision in Ntaganda may, in one sense, have been a small 
justice—one man will pay for the full balance of his wrongdoing. 
However, if it comes at the risk of state parties questioning their 
continued participation due to the activist methodologies of the Court, 
one wonders whether a much larger justice is being sacrificed in turn. 
This, I urge, must be the ever-present concern of the ICC: to execute the 
“established” will of the international community, and not its own.134 
Equally then, the role of jurisdictional expansion should be left to the 
Assembly of State Parties under the framework of Article 121 as the 
rightful “legislative” body of the Rome Statute.135 
  
dignity required. One could make a powerful case that the history of judicial review has 
been largely one of errors and tragedies.” Id.  
 133. Sadat, supra note 54, at 259. 
 134. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, arts. 
8(2)(b), 8(2)(e) (2002) (requiring the ICC to look to the “established framework of 
international law” in interpreting war crime violations); see also Lochner v. New York, 
198 U.S. 45, 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“This case is decided upon an economic theory 
which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed 
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. 
But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly believe that my agreement or 
disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in 
law.”).  
 135. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, art. 
121 (2002) (authorizing the Assembly of State Parties to adopt amendments to the Rome 
Statute).  
